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Measure under Guided Democracy Era:
Indonesia Experience in 1957 – 1967
VISHNU JUWONO
Faculty of Administrative Science, Universitas Indonesia
vjuwono@ui.ac.id
Abstract. This article highlighted how the last parliamentary system government reached the verge of collapse due to both Sukarno
and Nasution’s restlessness regarding what they saw as a corrupt politician that made parliamentary democracy dysfunctional and
ignored people’s interests. The partnership between Sukarno and Nasution was formed to establish a new political governance
structure that was underpinned by the army’s more assertive role in politics, called Guided Democracy. The article showed the
disunity between Hatta and Nasution which is resulted in a disjointed effort towards governance reform and anti-corruption
initiatives that was later dismantled by Sukarno and his supporter. This article used a range of primary sources including
diplomatic correspondents, memo, reports issued by the United Kingdom (UK) Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the
Australia Department of Foreign Affairs. In complementing these data from the UK and the Australia Government, this article
used other primary resources from Indonesian government such as relevant laws, presidential decrees and government regulations,
presidential speeches, international donor reports or documents and national as well as international article newspaper. The main
contribution of this article was to provide an ingrained account of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy era in the context of governance
reform and anti-corruption initiatives, which is currently lacking in the current academic corpus on Indonesia’s politics of public
policy.
Keywords: governance reform, corruption, Indonesian history, guided democracy
Abstrak. Artikel ini mencoba memberikan gambaran bagaimana runtuhnya sistem parlementer di Indonesia oleh kekhawatiran
Sukarno dan Nasution karena beranggapan bahwa politisi korup membuat demokrasi parlementer menjadi disfungsional serta
tidak digunakan untuk kepentingan rakyat. Kemitraan antara Sukarno dan Nasution membentuk sebuah struktur tata kelola politik
yang didukung oleh angkatan darat yang mempunyai peranan besar di politik, yang dikenal dengan nama Demokrasi Terpimpin.
Dalam artikel ini juga dijelaskan pertentangan antara Hatta dan Nasution yang menyebabkan tidak maksimalnya usaha reformasi
tata kelola dan inisiatif anti-korupsi, hingga akhirnya dibubarkan oleh Sukarno dan pendukungnya karena ketidak percayaannya
terhadap inisiatif tersebut. Sebagai sumber data riset, artikel ini menggunakan data primer diantaranya memo korespondensi
diplomatik, serta berbagai laporan yang diterbitkan oleh Kementerian Luar Negeri Inggris Raya (FCO) dan Departemen Luar
Negeri Australia. Untuk melengkapi data primer dari pemerintah Inggris Raya dan Australia, artikel ini juga menggunakan data
primer lainnya dari pemerintah Indonesia seperti Undang-Undang, Keputusan presiden, peraturan pemerintah, pidator presiden
serta data primer dalam bentuk laporan dan dokumen dari lembaga donor serta artikel dari media massa nasional maupun
internasional. Kontribusi artikel ini pada literatur akademik yang ada adalah berupa analisis terhadap era Demokrasi terpimpin di
masa Sukarno dalam konteks reformasi tata kelola dan inisiatif anti-korupsi, yang masih terbatas dalam berbagai literature politik
dan kebijakan publik di Indonesia.
Kata kunci: reformasi tata kelola, korupsi, sejarah Indonesia, demokrasi terpimpin

INTRODUCTION
The concept of governance reform as development
was widely used not just in the academic discourse;
therefore, it posed the risk of being multi interpreted.
International economic organizations, especially in
1990’s, was focusing on economic sector as widely
known then as ‘Washington Consensus’ that emphasized
on liberation whether in financial, trade or investment
sector (Williamson, 1994) or in judiciary sector that
advocated the need of impartial law enforcement system
(Lindsey 2002). Meanwhile leading scholars in politics
are focusing on the aspect of the quality of governance

(Fukuyama 2013) and the type of political architecture
(McIntyre 2003).
This article is applying a broader definition of
governance.
Governance is not only about the
government but also entails an interaction between
the state (government, legislature and judiciary) and
civil society (Bevir 2010). This article emphasizes the
political aspect of governance reform. In terms of the
time frame, the governance reform is seen as an effort
to enact policy that has long-term implications, with
the ultimate goal of strengthening and preserving the
democratic political structure in Indonesia that includes
an effective executive, a more robust parliament and
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a credible judiciary. Thus, governance reform can
be categorized into several areas that depend on the
policy priority, including economic governance reform,
constitutional amendments and judicial reform in context
of strengthening democratic political framework.
In terms of anti-corruption (AC) measures, Quah
identifies three patterns of anti-corruption initiatives in
Asian countries. The first pattern is where there exists an
anti-corruption law but no independent anti-corruption
agency; the second pattern is where there is an anticorruption law with multiple anti-corruption agencies;
and the third pattern is where there is an anti-corruption
law with one independent anti-corruption agency. Quah
argues that the third pattern is the most effective anticorruption model, because an independent agency that
solely focuses on combating corruption would not be
sidetracked by other priorities. But the third pattern does
not guarantee a success as require political support from
top leaders, especially the president (Quah 2008).
Meanwhile Kepundeh emphasizes that social action
coalitions linking public and private actors are needed
to mobilize participation and advocacy to ensure the
effectiveness of anti-corruption measure (Johnston
and Kepundeh 2003). In this article the anti-corruption
activity is focusing on the prosecution of large scale
corruption cases or those that implicate high profile
officials. As a result, the nature of their activity is to
create a deterrent effect, focusing more on investigation
as well as prosecution, and within the short-term time
frame, up to five years.
After the national election in 1955, it became evident
that the administrator group’s influence was significantly
reduced, since only the Islamic Political party Masyumi
managed to secure the second largest number of seats
in parliament. Meanwhile, the Solidarity maker group
secured the majority of parliamentary seats through
political parties like the Indonesia Nationalist Party
(PNI), the Revival of Religious Scholars (NU) and the
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).
This paper highlights how the last parliamentary
system government reached the verge of collapse due
to both Sukarno and Nasution’s restlessness regarding
what they saw as a corrupt politician and corrupt political
party that made parliamentary democracy dysfunctional.
It then outlines how the partnership between Sukarno
and Nasution to establish a new political governance
structure was underpinned by the army’s more assertive
role in politics, called Guided Democracy and explains
how the disunity between Hatta and Nasution resulted
in a disjointed effort towards governance reform and
anti-corruption initiatives that was later dismantled by
Sukarno, with strong support from the solidarity maker
group.
RESEARCH METHOD
This article utilizes a number of primary resources.
The rarely-used primary sources are from the United
Kingdom, and Australian embassies in Jakarta, available
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at the British National Archives and the Australian
National Archives. The Indonesian newspapers were
accessed from the Indonesia National Archives in
Jakarta as well as the Institutes of Southeast Asia
Studies (ISEAS)’s library in Singapore, like Pedoman,
Indonesia Raya, Kompas, Sinar Harapan, Tempo and
Suara Pembaruan. The international newspapers article
were compiled from British National Archives.
The Indonesian government has been posting Laws,
Government Regulations (PP), Presidential Decision
Decrees (Keppres), Presidential Instruction Decrees
(Inpres) as well as Presidential Regulation Decrees
(Perpres) via the Cabinet Secretary’s website (http://
sipuu.setkab.go.id/ ). Most of the laws and regulations
obtained from this government’s official website were
used for this article.
Written historical records and documents were
further supplemented by interviews. This is particularly
important as Indonesia has an oral rather than a written
culture, as a result of which documentations are sparse.
More than 80 interviews were conducted with highranking government officials, state officials, MPs,
Indonesian and foreign businessmen, Indonesian and
international Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO)
activists, Indonesian and foreign journalists, as well
as academic researchers specializing in Indonesian
politics. The interviewees involved during the data
collection from 2011 to 2014 were based in Jakarta,
London and Canberra. These interviews served the
purpose of adding detail to the written documentation
and exploring the motivation behind the key decisions.
Since the resource persons are mostly former high state
officials, policy maker, experts on Indonesia political
history; their relevant and valuable perspective are used
to develop the article to be more contextual.
RESULT AND DISCUSSION
The Political Rivalry between Sukarno, Hatta and
Nasution in the context of Governance Reform and AntiCorruption initiatives began with the political demise
of Vice President Hatta as leader of the administrator
group which should be highlighted as the contribution
to the ineffectiveness of their inability to preserve the
parliamentary democracy system. Hatta thought that
being Vice President was relatively ineffective since
the 1950 constitution only gave the President and Vice
President symbolic limited authority (Noer 1990).
During the 1950s through to the early 1960s,
despite his limited power, Sukarno went a long way in
challenging the boundaries and, thus, in some cases,
managed to intervene in government, which frustrated
successive Indonesian prime ministers during the
parliamentary democracy era. At least, Vice President
Hatta, represented the administrator group in policy
debates at the highest level, and would bring what Van
De Kroef described as ‘an orthodox economic rationale
in fiscal management.’ Even Kahin credited Hatta’s
work in the 1950s for integrating the Royal Netherlands
East Army (KNIL) with the armed forces, effectively
trying to reduce bureaucracy and ensure a smooth
transition from the Dutch-imposed federal structure to
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a unitary state (Kahin 1990).
Hatta felt that being a private citizen would give him
the flexibility and freedom to criticize the government.
Instead, he made a limited policy impact because of
his lack of political clout. Deliar Noer (1990, 720 –
723) argued that Hatta over-emphasized his personal
integrity as his political asset without making any
sustained effort to build his own political power base
especially through a political party.
As for the short-lived anti-corruption endeavor under
General Nasution through the Committee for Retooling
the State Apparatus (PARAN) and the Budhi operation,
this episode has been rarely discussed in the literature,
aside from being explained in the context of the political
rivalry between the army and the PKI, as discussed
by Sundhassen (1982), Feith (1964) and Pauker
(1964). Although the work by the State Apparatus
Activities Supervision Agency (BAPEKAN) led by
Hamengkubuwono IX should be noted, Nasution’s
initiatives should be considered the most systematic
anti-corruption attempt by a strong political leader
during the Guided Democracy era.
Thus, Hamengkubuwono IX, although widely
respected, did not have strong political leverage with
Sukarno compared to Nasution. Therefore, Sukarno
easily dissolved BAPEKAN in 1962. Hamengkubuwono
was abroad when BAPEKAN was dissolved. According
to Hamengkubuwono’s close advisor Prof. Selo
Soemardjan: ‘We only knew about the BAPEKAN
dissolvement by Sukarno through Newspaper.’ (‘Dari
Tromol Pos No. 8 [From P.O. Box no. 8]’, 2012).
When the PNI’s Ali Sastroamidjojo became prime
minister in 1957, the influence of the administrator
group was declining, following the resignation of Vice
President Mohammad Hatta in late 1956, the subsequent
dissolution of the Masyumi and the PSI in the mid1960s and, finally, the sudden death of Prime Minister
Djuanda in 1963. Therefore, the natural political ally for
Nasution in pushing governance reform was severely
weakened by Sukarno and the PKI. As a result, it was
unsurprising that Nasution’s anti-corruption drive
proved short-lived (1960-1964).
The turbulent relationship between Nasution and
Sukarno shows that Nasution possessed a puritanical
streak that distanced him from most of Indonesia’s
political leaders. Based on Penders and Sundhaussen
(1985) observation that Nasution refused to be involved
and ‘condemned the corruption which became a
hallmark of Sukarno’s style of government.’Amidst the
academic and policy-making debate on the political
format of Guided Democracy, Nasution tended to be a
junior partner of Sukarno. As the founding father of the
nation, combined with his superb oratorical skills and
mass mobilization, Sukarno was no match for Nasution.
Ultimately, Nasution was nearly able to consolidate
his authority in the army after the enactment of Guided
Democracy by Sukarno in the early 1960s, but the
previous strong anti-corruption drive and rationalization
of the army created enemies for Nasution. Sukarno
developed distaste for Nasution’s incorruptibility and
incessant refusal to join the high-life and Sukarno’s
corrupt, close aides in the palace. Therefore, Sukarno
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exploited the disgruntlement within the army to relegate
Nasution from direct army command in 1962. The
President gave Nasution the newly-established position
of Chief of Staff for the Armed Forces and forced him to
give up the influential post of Chief of staff for the Army
to his deputy, Maj. Gen. Ahmad Yani. Then, the chiefs
of staff of all four services (the army, navy, air force,
and police) were all promoted to commander, reporting
directly to the President. As a result, Nasution was
left with merely administrative coordination and civil
defense authority (Presidential Decision Decree number
225 year 1962 on the Appointment of the Armed Forces
Leaders with new Organizational Structure.)
Thus, Hatta and Nasution both exemplify the
intellectual cunning combined with extensive
government experience/military service that coalesced
with an incorruptibility streak. However, like other
administrator group members, Hatta and Nasution
proved incapable of expanding their distinguished
personal character into a formidable political electoral
machine. Nasution’s IPKI political party only acquired
4 parliamentary seats at the 1955 national election
(Sundhaussen 1982, 91). Although Hatta was de facto
leader of the administrator group in 1945-1956, he never
formally led a political party.
Initially, Hatta and Nasution enjoyed excellent
collaboration in the late 1940s-early 1950s over the
liquidation of the federal system and military reform
(Penders and Sundhaussen 1985, 78). When Hatta and
Nasution were both at the peak of their power during the
late period of parliamentary democracy, philosophical
differences arose between them, especially on the role
of the army in politics (Noer 1990, 467).
According to Penders and Sundhaussen, although
some of Nasution’s actions reflected the similarities
of the administrator group, he always had a strong
commitment to the values of Pancasila (the state’s five
principles) like the solidarity maker group (Penders and
Sundhaussen 1985, 179). Thus, after being reinstated
in 1955 as Army Chief, Nasution’s resentment of
politicians reinforced his political tilt toward supporting
Sukarno.
Hatta and Nasution could potentially have formed
a formidable alliance within the government which
may have constituted their best chance for pushing
governance reform and the anti-corruption initiative,
but they went their separate ways. Nasution preferred
to be Sukarno’s junior partner in supporting Guided
Democracy (Feith 1964, 978), while Hatta resigned
from the vice presidency. It is unsurprising, then, that
Sukarno and his solidarity maker group emerged as the
victors, easily dismantling the administrator group and
subsequently dismissing Nasution.
Even though Sukarno was able to establish a Guided
Democracy by outmaneuvering his political rivals, his
government was unable to deliver sufficient economic
and social welfare to the people as well as embroiling
them in corruption based on the following assessment
of the following the two leading academics. As Friend
sums up, ‘By 1964-1965, despite all of Sukarno’s talk
about socialization, Indonesia was becoming laissezfaire, with a corollary of hyper-corruption’ (Friend

60

International Journal of Administrative Science & Organization, May 2017
Bisnis & Birokrasi, Jurnal Ilmu Administrasi dan Organisasi

2003, 98). Meanwhile, John Legge observed that
Sukarno’s efforts to emphasize the style of politics over
the substance of the political program protected the
status quo of the corrupt elites (Legge 1972, 383 – 384).
More importantly, the perilous legacy of Guided
Democracy championed by Sukarno, created a template
for the authoritarian political governance structure that
undermined the checks-and-balance system. This was
evident when his successor, Suharto, consolidated and
even expanded for over three decades the authoritarian
political governance structure. This milestone was an
evident of the relapsed in governance reform under
Guided Democracy era.
Toward the end of Parliamentary Democracy under
Sukarno, President Sukarno appointed former Prime
Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo as formateur to set up
a cabinet on 8 March 1956 and it was agreed by the
PNI leadership that the main component of the new
government would consist of the PNI, the NU and
Masyumi (Rocamora 1974, 252).
In the end, Ali Sastroamidjojo’s second cabinet was
formed on 20 March 1956. Even though the PNI lead
the political party coalition within the cabinet with
six cabinet ministers including the position of Prime
Minister, the important ministerial posts for patronage
and party financing, such as the Minister of Finance,
Minister of the Interior and Minister for Economic
Affairs, belonged to the Masyumi and thek NU
(Rocamora 1974, 254). Surprisingly, the administrator
group type of figures remained influential in the cabinet.
This was a group whose power depended on their skill
in managing a modern government that placed a high
priority on economic as well as administrative problemsolving (Feith 2006, 471).
However, there was growing dissatisfaction with
Ali’s Government, since their priority in the first four
months of the cabinet was more the distribution of
patronage through go the cabinet appointment (Saner,
1956). The problem was compounded by the growing
concern that Ali’s Cabinet was failing to implement the
anti-corruption efforts of Burhannuddin’s government.
President Sukarno on 20 July 1956 decided to grant
a partial amnesty to Djody Gondokusumo, former
Minister of Justice in Ali’s first cabinet, which
disappointed Vice President Hatta, since he was not
consulted (Noer 1990, 476). Earlier, the Supreme Court
convicted Djody for corruption in January 1956 (Feith
2006, 337).
When Major General Nasution was re-appointed as
Army Chief in November 1955, he used the opportunity
to continue the military reform that had stalled after
his dismissal in 1952. He changed the management
structure of the military by creating an Inspectorate for
Education and Training section to improve the soldiers’
professionalism. A further reform was to empower
the Army Chief especially with the supervision and
coordination of its authority under the state of emergency
through creating the Inspectorate for Territorial Affair
and People Defense office (Sundhaussen 1982, 97).
In an effort to strengthen the central command
and dismantle the power of the regional commanders,
Nasution undertook a major re-assignment within the
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Army structure. Initially, he started with low- and midranking officers and then accelerated, with the main
targets being Nasution’s rivals, like Deputy Chief of
Staff Colonel Zulkifli Lubis (McVey 1971, 159). This
was also part of the governance reform within the army,
by creating soldiers a sense of regularity and structure
in their career and introduces a merit-based promotion
policy by setting-up a commission in 1956 to review the
army ranks and assignments.
The aforementioned commission was headed by his
trusted aide, Deputy Army Chief Gatot Soebroto, but
also included Nasution’s rival to show that it was free
from nepotism and it did not repeat the old mistake
of reorganization with the threat of unemployment.
Instead, the reorganization was accompanied by
assurances that the army would expand in size (McVey
1972, 154 – 155).
With the determination of the West Java officers
to oppose corruption that was mounting under Ali’s
government and also the effort to avoid reassignment
in August 1955, the Lubis group through troops in
West Java tried to arrest Minister of Foreign Affairs
Roeslan Abdulgani for corruption (MacDermot, 1956).
Abdulgani was preparing to attend a conference on the
Suez Canal incident in London when the West Java
troops summoned him for questioning under an arrest
warrant in connection with his dealings with Lie Hok
Tay, Deputy Director of the State Publishing House,
who had been convicted for corruption (“Corruption
in Indonesia? Foreign Minister Nearly Arrested”, 14
August 1956).
Prime Minister Sastroamidjojo was concerned
that the arrest of Foreign Minister Abdulgani would
jeopardize his government’s credibility, thus instructed
Nasution to rescind the arrest warrant (Sastroamijoyo
and Penders 1974, 200). After Nasution overrode the
instruction from the West Java troops, Abdulgani
was released and departed for London the same day
(‘Minister Arrest Countermanded’, 16 August 1956).
The press, which was closely affiliated with the
Masyumi and PSI, criticized the Cabinet over the
decision to release Abdulgani. Finally, although the
dissenter officers led by Colonel Lubis and others
planned the coup after he was rotated from a previous
post, this never materialized. Moreover, through
vigorous intelligence activities combined with
persuasion, Nasution’s deputy successfully reduced the
appeal of the coup but, more importantly, Lubis had no
clear political concept (Sundhaussen 1982, 101).
There was continuing fierce criticism in the press
coverage about the alleged corruption between
Abdulgani and Lie Hok Tay (“Panggil Menlu”, 1956).
Then, in response, Ali’s Cabinet established an ad
hoc committee led by First Deputy Prime Minister
Muhammad Roem to hear evidence on Abdulgani’s
alleged corruption. The committee decided that the
evidence provided by West Java troops in their attempt
to arrest Abdulgani was insufficient and declared that no
grounds existed on which to charge Abulgani (Nasution
1984, 23 – 24).
However, to the embarrassment of Ali’s government,
in December 1956, Mochtar Lubis was detained by the
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military Police Corps because his newspaper, Indonesia
Raya, was charged with libel for accusing Abdulgani
and Lie Hok Tay of corruption (Lubis 1980, 1- 22).
In the court, Lubis managed to demonstrate through
convincing documents and photos that Abdulgani had
indeed received a house and car from Lie and taken
dollars overseas for him in violation of the foreign
exchange regulations. Lubis was eventually acquitted
of all charges in July 1957. Abdulgani was prosecuted
(“Indonesian Minister in Court”, 1957) and, ultimately,
found guilty for illegally exporting foreign currency
(MacDermot 1957b).
Meanwhile, in the latest political development, there
was a hostile environment in which there was a strong
public perception that all of the political parties were
corrupt. Sukarno also contributed to the antagonism
toward the political party and the parliamentary
democracy system. In his speech on the Anniversary
of Indonesia Independence on 17 August 1955, he
criticized the current state of the political party and
Indonesian politicians:
Simplify the political party system; choose the
candidate who is a true leader! Vote for the parliament
who truly reflects the aspiration of 80 million Indonesian
people. Vote for the people who devoted their lives to
the Indonesian people and to country, not for the sake
of foreign interest, self-interest or the interests of the
group. (Sukarno 1955, 25).
After Indonesia proclaimed its independence in 1945,
the relations between Sukarno and Hatta was at the
peak, productive and respectful. As Hatta commented
of his partnership with Sukarno:
The Spirit and practice of Duumvirate were especially
in the form of an unwritten unanimity between the two
of us (Sukarno and Hatta); namely, our determination
that in leading the state during the revolution and the
struggle for independence, policies and actions should
be determined unanimously between two of us. We
signed many documents together. But, if one of us not
in the capital, the action of one of us was supported and
respected also by the other (Hatta and Z. Yasni 1981,
137 – 138).
As he was from Sumatra, Hatta represented the
non-Javanese ethnic group and also balanced the
flamboyance of Sukarno with his technical knowledge
of the economy and administrative discipline. Sukarno
was famous for his oratorical skill that would mobilize
a significant number of people, while Hatta with his
Dutch higher education background a had sufficient
knowledge on how modern economic system works.
However, it was gradually evident that the
disagreement between the two was difficult to
reconcile, that led to Vice-President Hatta’s resignation
in December 1956, which made the national political
situation even more difficult. Later, Hatta revealed that,
as Vice President he felt little hope that he would be
able to do much amidst the increasing mismanagement,
corruption and abuse of power. As he told Jacobs, ‘the
corruption issue while I was still in office is one of the
main reasons I resigned from the vice presidency’ (Noer
1990, 474).Hatta realized that the political constellation
was against him, especially with the growing power
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of Sukarno, as he received a fresh mandate from the
election in 1955 through the PNI and their ally (PKI and
NU) and won the 1955 presidential election. Sukarno’s
intention to dissolve parliament also attracted crucial
support from the powerful army, led by Nasution,
who was well-known for his disdain of politicians and
political parties that he considered corrupt.
During Ali’s second cabinet, the party and
parliamentary government rapidly lost their legitimacy
due to their inability to solve the governance and
economic problems. The cabinet was criticized for its
incapability to make bold decisions, like reducing the
number of civil servants or remedying the deteriorating
infrastructure. Nonetheless, Ali’s government should
also be commended for successfully pushing for
legislation on regional government whereby, in Law no
1 of 1957, inter alia that established a legal framework for
the financial relations between the Central Government
and the autonomous regional governments (Feith 2006,
552).
However, the public at large regarded the Ali Cabinet
as ineffectual, while the attitude of Indonesia’s political
leaders, with their lavish lifestyle and embroilment
in corruption, increased the resentment toward the
political party and parliamentary democracy system.
This was evident when latter Sukarno dissolved the
parliament in 1959, without significant opposition from
the public. Therefore, in the second Ali Cabinet, trust
in the political parties and parliamentary democracy hit
an all-time low (Feith 2006, 555). Even former VicePresident Hatta, who was known as a strong proponent
of the parliamentary democracy system, expressed his
disappointment with the political parties in Indonesia.
During his speech at Gadjah Mada University a couple
of days before he resigned as vice president, Hatta
commented:
Political Parties…have been made into an end in
themselves, the state being their tools. In this way, it is
being forgotten that promoting the interest of a political
party at the expense of the people is immoral and
incompatible with the Pancasila, particularly as regards
the principle of a belief in one God. (Hatta 1956, 12)
In response to the deep public dissatisfaction, Ali
Sastroamidjojo returned his mandate to President
Sukarno on 14 March 1957. The Army led by Nasution
had ferociously lobbied to declare a national state of
emergency mainly to deal with the rebellion movement
in the regions. In the end, Sukarno had decreed a national
state of emergency (Government Regulation No. 13
year 1957 on Revision of Government Regulation on
the Appointment on the Leader of Military Emergency
Authority). This marked the closing stage of the
parliamentary democracy system in Indonesia, as the
state of emergency catapulted the Indonesian Army into
assuming an important political role. This again showed
that the governance reform agenda was experiencing
a set-back where there was a systematic effort to
concentrate power under the executive by weakening
the parliament and the judiciary.
The introduction of Guided Democracy, the army’s
limited anti-corruption measure and its entanglement
in patronage were all initiated be events such as the
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several failed attempts to set-up a new cabinet. This led
to an unprecedented step whereby President Sukarno
appointed himself as a ‘citizen’ to form a cabinet in
April 1957. Sukarno appointed non-party, experienced
minister, Djuanda, as Prime Minister.
The cabinet members were appointed as individuals,
not for their political affiliation, and comprised a
number of individuals known for their technical skills.
The cabinet was still dominated by the political parties,
with four from the PNI, four from the NU, one from
both the Parkindo, and the PSII party. There were two
sympathizers with the PKI and two others from the
People at Large Forum (Murba) party (Lev and Finch
1965, 36 – 37).
Under the state emergency, the Army introduced
a number of anti-corruption measures that grew out
of a meeting of the Army leadership in March 1957
about the ever-growing problem of corruption among
politicians. Subsequently, the Army issued a number of
decrees that gave them the authority to act on corruption
(Presidential Decision Decree number 48 year 1957 on
mandate from President to all State officials to Continue
Working; the Emergency Military Ruler number 6 year
1957 on anti-corruption measure: The Emergency
Military Ruler number 6 year 1957 on anti-corruption
measure). The focus of these anti-corruption measures
was to investigate politicians who had amassed
suspicious assets. Thus, the Army examined personal
bank accounts to determine the source of suspicious
assets. Furthermore, many of the sources of party funds
were co-opted by the military headquarters to establish
control over key government offices, especially in the
regions.
The anti-corruption measures executed by the
Army unnerved many political party leaders, who
were concerned about the possibility of being targeted
discriminately by the Army, especially those from the
opposition parties, like the Masyumi and the PSI. For
instance, former Minister of Finance Jusuf Wibisono
from the Masyumi was arrested on March 1957, accused
of providing illegal credit to his business cronies while
still in government, and then released a year later, in
March 1958, due to a lack of evidence (Soebagijo I.N
1980, 221). Meanwhile, the PSI politician, Soemitro
Djodjohadikusumo, was also interrogated for alleged
corruption in distributing credit as Minister of Finance.
Sensing his imminent arrest, Soemitro managed to
escape and flee the country (Lubis 1980, 67 – 69).
With a number of former ministers and politicians
being investigated, the relationship between the Army
and the political parties became strained. Nasution
finally admitted the shortcomings of the anti-corruption
campaign due to the lack of clear rules and regulations,
and also the fact that the Army was occupied with
growing challenges from the regional military
commanders. As Nasution elucidated:
With the current state of rules and regulations in
Indonesia, it was very difficult to prosecute high officials
or former ministers accused of corruption because of
difficulties in providing evidence. Therefore, I can only
apply administrative sanctions, such as suspension, or
impose house arrest during the interrogation. ((Lubis

Volume 24, Number 2

1980, 82 – 85).
The state emergency provided an opportunity for
the army to broaden its political role through their
appointments to civil service positions or as the
heads of local government (McVey 1972, 159). It also
provided an opportunity for the Army to expand its role
in the state economy, where in the name of restoring
political stability they took over the Dutch companies
that previously had been taken over by its employees in
1957 during the campaign to force the Dutch out of West
Irian (MacDermot 1958). For instance, 40 ships owned
by the Dutch steamship company, KPM, were detained
by Indonesian workers, before being taken over by the
army (“KPM Diambil Oper oleh Pemerintah”, 1957).
The involvement of the Army in economic activities
was well-known in export-producing commodity regions
like North Sumatra and North Sulawesi to compensate
for their limited budget by supporting the semi-official
smuggling during the mid-1950s. Elsewhere, the army
was engaged in illegal business activities in cooperation
with the local leaders. However, these activities were
very limited and did not provide any opportunities for
personal enrichment (Crouch 1978, 38).
In contrast, the new opportunities provided by the
state emergency law implicated some army officers
in corruption practices. Nasution and his loyalists
were apprehensive about the increasing evidence of
corruption and commercialism among the Army and
ordered an investigation (Lev 2009, 214). For instance,
Nasution introduced several measures against highranking officers, including Colonel Ibnu Sutowo,
Colonel Dachjar and others, based on news leaked in
November-December 1958, because of their alleged
involvement in rubber smuggling. Thus, officers who
were suspected of corruption were either suspended
(Ibnu) or transferred (Dachjar).
The corruption cases certainly weakened the Army’s
position vis-a-vis politicians in parliament, but this was
offset by the low standing of the political parties among
the general public. Please provide fact(s)/evidence(s) to
support the statements here. In the end, the Djuanda
cabinet managed to secure parliamentary approval
to extend the state emergency law in December 1958
because of Djuanda’s implied threat of a possible Army
coup (Lev 2009, 219).
However, in other political developments, there
was a deadlock in 1959 between the President and
political party leaders in government (the PNI, the
NU and the PKI) on the composition of the functional
group representative who would be appointed by the
president in parliament. Even during the negotiations
for the restoration of the 1945 constitution, Prime
Minister Djuanda and Nasution, in a bid to obtain an
endorsement, declared that the corruption charges
pending against NU’s politicians - from the army
anti-corruption campaign in December 1958 - would
be prosecuted unless they received NU support on 19
February 1959 (Lev 2009, 264 – 265).
Subsequently, Sukarno announced the decision
to restore the 1945 constitution in February 1959 and
submitted the proposal to constituent an assembly for
approval, but ultimately was deadlock. In response,
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Sukarno dissolved the constituent assembly, announcing
on 5 July 1959 that he had issued a decree for the
restoration of the 1945 constitution (Presidential Decree
on 5 July 1959) and installed ‘Guided Democracy.’
President Sukarno’s alliance with the army marked
the end of the administrator group. After the political
and military victory by Sukarno and Nasution over the
rebel government, riding in the wave of strong political
capital, they managed to dissolve the administrator
group, turned them into irrelevant political forces, at
the expense of governance reform and anti-corruption
initiatives.
After Djuanda returned his mandate on 6 July 1959,
Sukarno assumed full executive authority as both
President and Prime Minister to form his own cabinet.
However, he was concerned about the growing influence
of the Army in both politics and commerce since the
state emergency enacted in March 1957. Therefore,
he tried to reduce Nasution’s influence by offering
him the Minister of Defense post, in the hope that he
would resign from the powerful Army Chief post. This
backfired when Nasution publicly announced that he
would take the Minister of Defense position, while also
retaining the Army Chief post (Lev 2009, 497).
Since Sukarno uninterested in managing the daily
governmental affairs, he appointed Djuanda as First
Minister, who was tasked with helping Sukarno to
run the daily governmental affairs, representing the
government in parliament and also acting as a buffer
between Sukarno and Nasution, the political parties
and other government agencies (Presidential Decision
Decree number 236 year 1960 on First Minister). The
composition of the cabinet that was announced showed
the further decline of the political parties in the cabinet
with the majority of members being non-party experts
(Lev and Finch 1965, 43 – 45). In the end, the cabinet
introduced a new organizational structure with the
growing influence of Nasution, as evident from the
exclusion of the PKI. The cabinet consisted of nine core
ministers, with each figure responsible for coordinating
several junior ministers, and there were also seven exofficio ministers (UK Foreign Commonwealth Office
1959).
The alliance between Sukarno and Nasution proved
to be based on political mutual interest rather than
a fundamental agreement, as shown when Acting
Attorney General Gatot Tarunamihardja in August 1959
re-opened the investigation on trade import bartering
at Tanjung Periok Port, which implicated powerful
Army officers, like Colonel Sukendro and Colonel Ibnu
Sutowo. The Army retaliated by arresting Gatot in
September 1959, charged with plotting with the leftwing
element in government, and even accusing Gatot and
colleagues of involvement in illegal textile trading
(The Australia Embassy 1959 a). In the end, Sukarno
agreed on a compromise, in which Gatot was honorably
dismissed in September 1959 in exchange for replacing
the high-ranking army officers who were allegedly
involved in corruption (The Australia Embassy 1959b).
However, political maneuvering by Sukarno and the
Army began to emerge, as both were trying to increase
their political leverage. The army started to pressure
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the PKI in July 1960 by acting outside the region rather
than in Jakarta, through interrogating the member of
the PKI central committee, Sukirman, in Bandung
and another four of the PKI’s central committee in
Jakarta. Shortly after the pressure by the army on the
PKI, Sukarno retaliated by ordering that the two main
opposition parties – the Masyumi and the PSI – should
be dissolved for a month or faced a ban (Australia
Embassy 1960). Sukarno then issued two decrees
restricting the political parties’ activities by demanding
that they obtained permission to conduct these activity
(the Supreme War Administrator Decree 6/ 1960 on
Ceasing of All Political Activities, Article 1 section 1).
Eventually, due to their involvement with the
regional rebel movement, the Masyumi and PSI became
politically isolated and voluntarily dissolved themselves
in September 1960 (Australia Embassy, 1960). This
marked the end of the ‘administrator’ politician’s group
influence on the government that had been powerful in
1949-1957 in steering the governance reform agenda
and pushing for anti-corruption measures.
The dismantlement of anti-corruption measure
began with the Army’s decisive victory against the
regional rebels and the further authority expansion of
the President not just in the executive sphere but also
in the legislative one that made Sukarno - supported by
Nasution - the principal power in government during
1960-1962. There was close cooperation between these
two powerful figures on large issues on which they
agreed, but still rivalry, distrust and competition. This
mutual understanding between Sukarno and Nasution
during the 1960s established a basis for the stable
political alliance that lasted until the end of the West
Irian campaign in 1962.
Meanwhile, the PKI in 1959 had stepped-up its
criticism of the government’s economic and business
policy. One of their criticisms was the involvement
of the army in a state enterprise when they took over
the Dutch business at the end of 1957, because the state
enterprises that were managed by military officers were
inefficient and corrupt. This was evident seven years
latter when Gen. Nasution investigated his fellow high
ranking army officers who were suspected of implicated
in corruption such as Col, Ibnu Sutwo who was leading
an oil and gas State Enterprise PERMINA or Col.
Surhardiman of PT Djaya Bhakti (Nasution 1984 b, 266).
The fact that the army officer’s managers were seen to
be making a profit for themselves created resentment
from the labor union, one of the main constituents of the
PKI. Taking advantage of this growing resentment, the
PKI prepared and helped to articulate a political attack
against corrupt officials or state-owned enterprise
managers as ‘bureaucratic capitalists’ and ‘economic
saboteurs.’ (Feith and Castles 1970, 404)
In his political manifesto, ‘The Rediscovery of our
Revolution,’ Sukarno emphasized the need to ‘retool’ all
the state instruments and eradicate the ‘liberal elements’
so that it would be filled with supporters of his Guided
Democracy (Sukarno 1959). To implement this task,
Sukarno established two institutions. Initially, he was
setting up the State Apparatus Activities Supervision
Agency (BAPEKAN), whose responsibilities included

64

International Journal of Administrative Science & Organization, May 2017
Bisnis & Birokrasi, Jurnal Ilmu Administrasi dan Organisasi

supervising any activities undertaken by the state
apparatus and conducting research on how to improve
its performance (President Regulation number 1/
1959 on the establishment of State Apparatus Activity
Supervision Agency (BAPEKAN), Article 4 section 1
and 2).
BAPEKAN also had authority, inter alia, to provide
advice based on their research and also to manage public
complaints to improve the state apparatus’ performance
and reputation. To increase its clout, Sukarno appointed
the highly-regarded former Minister of Defense,
Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, as BAPEKAN’s chief,
at a level equal to minister (Presidential Decision
Decree 177/ 1959 on the Appointment of Chair and
Commissioner of State Apparatus Activity Supervision
Agency [BAPEKAN]; Presidential Decree 178/1959 on
Ministerial Rank given to the Chair of the BAPEKAN).
The BAPEKAN received an enthusiastic response
from the Indonesian people, who had high expectations
of their reporting of petty and large corruption cases,
like the Rp. 40 million stolen from Jakarta’s custom
office in 1950-1960 and the Rp. 274,135.49 stolen
from Cooperatives within the State Apparatus Bank
in Karo. With only 40 secretariat staff, BAPEKAN
was overwhelmed with public enthusiasm to report
corruption that reached 912 complaints by July 1960,
400 of which had been processed.
The second agency to be established was PARAN
in January 1960, initiated and chaired by General
Nasution and Roeslan Abdulgani as Vice Chair
(Presidential Decision Decree number 10 year1960
on the establishment of the Committee of Retooling
State Apparatus (Panitia Retooling Aparatur Negara
– PARAN)). However, Sukarno wanted the PARAN
to focus on the indoctrination of his revolutionary
fanfare, while Nasution wanted the committee to
focus its efforts on governance reform, particularly
reorganization, personnel management as well as anticorruption efforts (Nasution 1984, 256). The initiative
by Nasution to focus PARAN on the governance issue
was seen as an effort to regain public trust in the army,
since its image had been tarnished because of the
corruption of the army managers in a number of state
owned enterprises.
However, the existence of PARAN created anxiety
among civil servants, especially as those who were seen
as too close to the opposition groups, like the Masyumi
and PSI (Rogers 1960), had eventually been demoted
to less powerful positions. There was also tension with
BAPEKAN as, clearly, these two agencies overlapped.
For instance the two institutions was focusing in
uncovering corruption in public sector, without clear
emphasize, for instance which one focusing on prevention
and which one focusing on prosecution or auditing. The
tension increased when PARAN announced its plan to
‘retool’ BAPEKAN, but the conflict was resolved when
Hamengkubuwono IX managed to meet Nasution at
the end of November 1960, when they agreed on the
division of labor between the two institutions. Whereas
BAPEKAN focused on supervision and research,
PARAN focused on ‘retooling,’ which emphasized
prosecutions for corruption (“Dari Tromol Pos No. 8”,
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BAPEKAN only lasted for around three years,
however. The trigger for its downfall was when
Indonesia was selected to host the Asian Games in 1962.
As the host government accelerated its development
projects around Jakarta, such as building roads, hotel
and sports facilities, involved huge financial resources.
BAPEKAN received a number of reports from the public
about alleged corruption and started to investigate a
development project related to the hosting of the games.
Midway through this investigation, Sukarno announced
in May 1962 (President Regulation number 3/ 1962 on
the Disbandment of the State Apparatus Activities State
Agency (BAPEKAN) Article 1). Hamengkubuwono
IX and the other commissioners of BAPEKAN were
discharged honorably in May 1962 (Presidential
Decision Decree number 166/ 1962 on Honorably
Discharge of Chair and Member of BAPEKAN, Point
2).
PARAN only received significant support for its
indoctrination aspect, since Vice Chair Abdulgani was
assigned by Sukarno as Spokesperson of his ideological
programs MANIPOL/ USDEK (Presidential Decision
Decree Number 184 year 1964 on the Appointment of
Dr. H. Roeslan). As a result, a number of Nasution’s
programs in PARAN did not receive support from the
cabinet, by ignoring, for instance, Nasution’s proposals
to separate the political from the technical positions
within the state agencies and the standardization of the
Organizational Structure (Nasution 1984, 258- 259).
The biggest challenge that PARAN faced was from the
PKI, however, Nasution’s main adversary. Therefore,
PARAN was constantly attacked since its inception and
accused by the PKI of being Nasution’s platform for his
presidential run.
The success of the West Irian campaign in 1962
enhanced the credibility of Sukarno among the other
army leaders, thereby weakening Nasution’s political
leverage. Also, Nasution’s anti-corruption drive through
PARAN made his corrupt colleague feel threatened,
so this combination of factors prompted division and
rivalry within the Army (Sundhaussen 1982, 164).
Sukarno seized the rare opportunity of division within
the army to challenge Nasution’s authority. Sukarno
gave Nasution the newly-established position as the
Armed Forces Chief and forced him to surrender the
influential Army Chief post to his deputy, Ahmad Yani.
Then, all four services chiefs (the army, navy, air force,
and police) were promoted to commander, reporting
directly to the President, which left Nasution with
merely administrative coordination and civil defense
authority (Crouch 1978, 53).
With his authority deteriorating, Nasution intensified
his efforts to eradicate corruption through a military
operation entitled Operasi Budhi in December 1963.
The operation was established based on a Presidential
decree that gave a mandate to Nasution especially as
Chair of PARAN to lead the operation with a mission
to prevent and prosecute corruption in state enterprises
and government institutions (Presidential Decision
Decree number 277 year 1963 on task force of Operasi
Budhi), which involved former ministers, MPs as well
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as politicians (PPADT 2002, 312 – 313). The initial
target of this Operasi Budhi was the state enterprise
(SOE) in which Nasution established a committee of
experts that formed questioners targeted at SOE’s CEO
who inquired into company financial performance and
required reports on their personal wealth and its sources
(Nasution 1984, 262).
The findings of Operasi Budhi can be categorized
into two groups: criminal offence findings, whereby
the team would give evidence to the law enforcement
agencies regarding prosecution and administrative
violations, whereby the team would submit the evidence
and provide advice for remedies. At the time, around
49 state enterprises/institutions were investigated
by the operation (Nasution 1963) that uncovered a
hundred million losses by state enterprises because of
conflicts of interest, whereby the executives were using
state enterprise facilities to run their own businesses.
Rosihan Anwar predicted that around Rp.14 billion of
state money remained unaccounted for (Anwar 2006,
284).
Nasution claimed that Operasi Budhi was successful
in preventing around Rp. 11 billion state losses in its
first 3 months of operation (Nasution 1984, 262) but had
discomfited Sukarno and his associates. The erroneous
practice of supplying money to the palace to ensure
that corrupt high state officials were not rotated or
wanted lucrative posts was quite staggering. Based on
information from his source, according to Pedoman’s
Chief Editor Rosihan Anwar, each official would donate
around Rp. 300 million to US$450,000, to secure their
job or seek a more lucrative position.
Following a continuous campaign to oust Nasution
from PARAN, the PKI succeeded in persuading Sukarno
to dissolve PARAN (‘Politics: General Nasution’, 1963).
First, Sukarno established the Supreme Command
for Retooling the Tools of the Revolution (KORTAR),
led by himself, with Major Gen. Yani as its Chief of
Staff, in April 1964 (Presidential Decision Decree
[KEPPRES} number 98 year 1964 on the Establishment
of the Supreme Command for Retooling the Tools of the
Revolution (KORTAR)). Immediately after KORTAR
was established, PARAN was disbanded by the
President in May 1964 (Decision Decree (Keputusan
Presiden – KEPPRES) number 117 year 1964 on the
disbandment of the Committee for Retooling the State
Apparatus (PARAN)), in the midst of handling only
10% of their cases (Nasution 1984, 266).
The vigor of PARAN in prosecuting fellow Army
officers created further friction within the army,
especially between Nasution and newly-appointed
Army’s Chief Ahmad Yani. It was suspected that
Yani’s approval of the termination of PARAN stemmed
from his concern that the corruption investigation had
touched upon his supporters who held strategic positions
such as Col. Ibnu Sutowo of Permina, Col. Surhardiman
and Col. Surjo (Crouch 1978, 80).
While the Indonesian economy continued to
deteriorate from 1963 due to the West Irian Campaign,
there was an urgent need for the government to put its
house in order and embark on economic governance
reform (Gilchrist 1964). Realizing that the worsening
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economic conditions that affect the public at large could
dent his popularity, in March 1963, Sukarno delivered
a speech to assure the public, known as the Economic
Declaration (Dekon). In formulating Dekon, Sukarno
requested assistance from political and intellectual
figures with a strong association with the disbanded
PSI (Indonesia Socialist Party), through which they
were able to incorporate several economic governance
reform proposals including the need for bureaucratic
reform and decentralized management (Anwar 2006,
232).
In following up Sukarno’s Dekon speech, First
Minister Djuanda attempted to impose economic
governance reform, aiming to solve Indonesia’s
economic predicament through various governance
reform measures while, as Indonesia’s economy was
now in dire straits, he simultaneously pushed for
the mission from the IMF to come to Indonesia and
assess the feasibility of offering assistance (Australia
Ambassador to Jakarta 1963).
Subsequently, Djuanda introduced economic
governance policy outlining the need to increase
prices, devalue the currency, and seek price stability
and deregulation to remove the bottlenecks in the
bureaucracy in May 1963. However, this economic
governance reform measure immediately came under
attack from the PKI and its supporter, who were
concerned about the prospect of enacting the ’liberal
policy’ that would trigger the engagement of foreign,
western investors as well as international organizations
like the IMF, but avoid attacking Sukarno that protected
them from the army (Gilchrist 1964).
The constant attack by the PKI during July-September
1963 was finally rewarded with the statement by
Sukarno that the reform program needed to be corrected
(Mortimer 2006, 267), but Djuanda’s economic reform
program was shattered by the initiation of Malaysia’s
confrontation campaign and his sudden death in
November 1963.
With more than half of borrowing from communist
bloc countries, which was mainly used to buy defense
equipment as well as weapons, the government had
little choice but to finance the budget deficit by printing
money, which had significant inflationary effects.
Meanwhile, the political polarization continued,
especially between Sukarno – the army – and the PKI.
This aggravated the division among the Indonesian
elites and the constant cabinet turnover hampered any
efforts to address the economic morass, as there was
neither the political will nor the leadership to sustain
economic reform (Booth 1998, 176 – 178).
In the end, on 30 September 1965, the tension between
Sukarno (supported by the PKI) and the army erupted
in the form of an attempted coup by a number of midlevel army officers who were Sukarno’s supporter, who
took the life of six army generals, including the Army
Chief Ahmad Yani. This tragedy gave momentum for
the Army to consolidate its power, and it eradicated
the PKI through the use of force as well as politically
and eventually out-maneuvered Sukarno in the course
of two years to take power, with Suharto becoming
Indonesia’s acting President in 1967 and consequently
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full President. This marked the end of Sukarno’s Guided
Democracy.
CONCLUSION
Utilizing a significant number of primary and
secondary sources, this article identifies that with the
resignation of then Vice President M. Hatta in 1956,
combines with the temporary alliance between Sukarno
and General Nasution between 1956 – 1959, it accelerates
the decline of governance reform and anti-corruption
measure. Furthermore, there is the significant setback
during Guided Democracy era since Sukarno thought
that the anti-corruption and governance reform measure
either by Nasution or Hamengkubuwono was trying to
delegitimize or threaten his close-aide and therefore had
to be restrained. Thus, during this era there was a lack of
political support that was urgently needed to ensure the
effectiveness of governance reform and anti-corruption
measure in that challenging period.
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